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Abstract—We set up differential phase shift quantum key
distribution (DPS-QKD), over 105 km of single mode optical
fiber, with a quantum bit error rate less than 15% at a secure
key rate of 2 kbps. The testbed was first used to investigate the
effect of excess bias voltage and hold-off time on the temporal
distribution of photons within a gate window of an InGaAs
single-photon detector (SPD), and quantified the effects of after
pulsing. The key generation efficiency, and security, in DPS-QKD
improve with an increase in the number of path delays or time-
bin superpositions. We finally demonstrate the implementation
of superposition states using a time-bin approach, and establish
an equivalence with the path-based superposition approach, thus
yielding a simpler approach to implementing superposition states
for use in DPS-QKD.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution; differential phase
shift protocol; spatial superposition; time-bin superposition
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key ex-
change between authenticated users, Alice and Bob, by re-
lying on two aspects of quantum mechanics, Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle and the no-cloning theorem [1, 2]. When
an adversary, Eve, attempts to steal information from the
quantum channel, she also inevitably introduces disturbances
in the channel and reveals herself. Since the first proposal by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [2], there have been a variety of
QKD protocols both proposed and implemented [3–6]. Field
demonstrations of QKD have mostly used discrete variables,
and with some active stabilization to mitigate environmental
fluctuations [7]. Appendix A provides the reader with a quick
summary of key rates and channel lengths for a few recent
implementations of QKD.
K. Inoue et. al proposed a differential phase-shift quan-
tum key distribution (DPS-QKD) protocol, that is easy to
implement and robust against slowly varying environmental
fluctuations [6, 8]. DPS-QKD uses a pair of phases Φ = 0, pi
to generate non-orthogonal states that cannot be distinguished
with absolute certainty using a single measurement [9]. A
theoretical security proof of the DPS protocol was established
under the assumption that Eve is restricted to individual
attacks [10]. Conventional DPS-QKD was demonstrated with
sifted key rates of 2 Mb/s and 166 bits/s over a 10 km and
100 km fiber respectively, using a low jitter frequency up-
conversion single photon detector [11]. Shibata et al. demon-
strated first long distance differential phase shift quantum key
distribution (DPS-QKD) over a 336 km length of dispersion
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shifted fiber using weak coherent pulses (WCPs) and super-
conducting nanowire single-photon detectors [12].
The main security threat to such systems arises from the
finite probability that some pulses contain more than one
photon. Hence, the photon number splitting (PNS) attack by
Eve severely limits the distance over which secure keys can
be transmitted in such QKD systems. In a PNS attack, Eve
performs a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement on
each WCP. Entangled photon pair based QKD schemes are
robust against such attacks [13, 14]. But, such demonstrations
of entanglement-based QKD suffer from a lower secure key
rate (less than 1 bit/s) and are limited to shorter lengths
of optical fibres. Continuous variable systems are harder to
implement, but can use telecommunication grade components
and provide security against general collective eavesdropping
attacks [15–17].
The unconditional security of a single-photon source, with
path superposition and a differential phase, yields an opti-
mally secure key generation rate per pulse with a maximum
achievable distance [18]. Thereafter, an efficient phase en-
coding quantum key generation scheme, with narrow band
heralded photons, was proposed by Yan et al. [19]. The
differential quadrature scheme, DQPS-QKD, uses four phases
Φ = 0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2 to generate four non-orthogonal states,
analogous to the BB84 protocol [20]. The recently introduced
round-robin differential phase-shift quantum key distribution
(RR-DPS-QKD) scheme address the effects of environmental
disturbances, and give us an upper bound on our tolerance to
error rates with a bit error rate as high as 29% [21]. But such
schemes requires the addition of optical switches and delays
that make Bob’s set-up more complex [22].
In this article, we aim to establish the equivalence between
spatial and temporal generation of a superposition state, for
use in a DPS-QKD system. In Sec. IV, we show that the
two methods yield comparable key rates in kbps, with a
QBER < 0.2. However, time-bins are defined electronically,
and are significantly easier to generate. The scheme does
require more precise timing synchronization, and we have
developed the means to characterize the photon arrival time
at our detector to within 50 ps.
After-pulsing effects are an inherent limitation of a single
photon detector (SPD) and have a considerable impact on high
speed QKD systems [23]. This effect is associated with the
lifetime of trapped carriers and determines the hold-off time
after a successful detection [24]. In Sec. IV-A, we propose
a characterization method for the after-pulsing probabilities
using a picosecond mode locked fibre laser. These detector
characterization experiments help us quantify the errors in our
4-state DPS implementation, with a resolution of 55 ps, and
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better distinguish the photon arrival time-bins.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In the original proposal for DPS-QKD, a single photon
is allowed to pass through a beam splitter, travel through
different path delays and is recombined back to create a
superposition state of the photon [6]. However, this scheme
encounters beam splitter losses and reduces the secure key rate.
With a path superposition of N -paths, and a relative phase of
{0, pi} between paths, the photon can be in a superposition of
2N−1 states. Similar states can be also achieved with time-bin
superposition by adding a relative phase at N − 1 locations
within a single pulse. In this article, we define 2N−1 as M ,
and hence, refer to the 3-pulse DPS-QKD as a 4-state system,
to allow us to describe the creation of superposition states by
temporal phase modulation [19].
We describe our experiments with 4-state DPS-QKD, using
spatial and time-bin superposition of a weak coherent source,
as shown in Fig. 1. The time-bin superposition scheme is
easier to implement and control, and can be extended to an
M -state DPS-QKD scheme without any additional hardware
complexity. When we use a superposition of 4 states, an
intercept and resend (IR) attack by Eve introduces a 33% error
on the sifted key. We had previously reported that the 4-state
DPS scheme is more secure against both IR and beam splitter
attacks. This percentage error increases to 50% when 4-state
DPS is extended to M -state DPS [25].
Fig. 1: 4-state DPS-QKD schemes using (a) spatial and (b)
time-bin superposition with a weak coherent source. WCS:
Weak coherent source, PM: phase modulator, T: time, D1
and D2: single photon detectors.
The methodology used to implement a weak coherent source
(WCS) is described along with the rest of our experimental
setup in Sec. IV-B.
III. KEY GENERATION IN DPS-QKD
In our 4-state DPS-QKD implementation. Alice sends a
single photon in a superposition of 3 pulses to Bob. The
probability of a photon traveling through one of the 3 paths
in the Alice’s set-up is 1/3. The superposition state generated
from Alice can be represented as follow:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
3
[|1〉a |0〉b |0〉c ± |0〉a |1〉b |0〉c ± |0〉a |0〉b |1〉c] (1)
, 1√
3
[|100〉abc ± |010〉abc ± |001〉abc] (2)
This superposition of 3 time-bins is passed through a delay
line interferometer (DLI) at Bob’s site. As a result, the
photon is now in a superposition of 4 time-bins. The first
and last time-bins do not contain encoded phase difference
information, whereas the 2 central time-bins contribute to the
key generation. This can also be observed classically, but at
higher photon numbers, as shown in Fig. 2. Alice now encodes
her random key bit as a random phase φ = {0, pi} between
successive time bins. Bob extracts the key information using a
DLI and two single-photon detectors. Eve introduces an error
of 33% in the sifted key in the 4-state DPS compared to the
25% error when using a train of WCPs in conventional DPS-
QKD. The higher error rate in 4-state DPS makes it easier to
detect Eve’s presence.
Fig. 2: Photodetector output after Alice’s path superposition
and Bob’s DLI, captured with a diode laser source. The key
is generated by the interference in time-bins b and c.
A photon is detected in the first (last) time slot if it travels
through first (third) path in Alice’s 3 pulse set-up and shorter
(longer) arm in Bob’s DLI. The probability of detection of a
photon in the 1st and 4th time slot is 16+
1
6 =
1
3 . Thus, the sifted
key rate (Rsifted) is equal to 23 . Similarly, if Alice transmits n
photons where each photon is in a superposition of N time-
bins, only n
[
N−1
N
]
photons contribute to the final keys, and
hence the sifted key rate (RSifted) is equal to N−1N [25]. For a
higher value of N , the sifted key rate converges towards 1 as
shown in Fig. 3. We also show the dependence of secure key
rate on the number of delays/time-bins in Alice’s setup. The
secure key rate is given as [11]
Rsec = Rsifted
(
τ − f(e)h(e)), (3)
where τ is the shrinking factor, e is the error rate, f(e)
captures the inefficiency of the error correcting code, and h(e)
is the binary Shannon entropy. The error rate depends upon
dark counts and other system imperfections. τ captures Eve’s
knowledge of the key. In this paper, we assume Eve’s attack to
be limited to IR and beamsplitter attacks only. Increasing N
changes the efficacy of the attacks, thus making τ a function of
N [25]. Hence, a secure key rate that depends on both Rsifted
and τ , varies with N as shown in Fig. 3.
Experimentally, the generation of a superposition state can
be realized spatially using passive beam splitters (or beam
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combiners). However, passive beam splitters have insertion
losses and the sifted key rate is reduced by a factor of N , thus
making the implementation inefficient. The optimal number of
paths in such a scenario was determined to be 3 paths, or a
superposition of 3 time-bin states [25]. As described by (2),
these states form 4 non-orthogonal states that Alice uses to
transmit the key. Keeping in mind the ease of implementing
time-bin superposition, we advocate temporal bins using phase
modulation, over different spatial paths. This would allows us
to use N > 3 and obtain a higher sifted key rate, as seen in
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3: Estimates for the sifted and secure key rate for
M -state DPS-QKD.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Characterization of single photon detectors
The state at the output port of Bob’s DLI, consists of a single
photon in one of 4 time-bins. A correct identification of these
time-bins needs an accurate temporal characterization of the
single photon detector (SPD), and its associated electronics.
Mode
Locked
Laser
SPDCoupler
5%
Detector
FPGA
Board
[0.010, 42]
TDC
95%
STOP
LVCMOS
<n>~0.1
START
External
gate
[10, 42]
[21, 42]
[Ton(ns), Time Period(ns)]
VOA
[2, 42]
Data
Acquisition
Electrical Optical
Gate Pulses
MLL Pulses
2 ns
42 ns
10 ps
Fig. 4: After pulsing characterization set-up.
Short coherent pulses, generated from a 1555 nm mode
locked fiber laser, were attenuated to a mean photon number
µ ∼ 0.1 and allowed to fall on a gated SPD as shown in
Fig. 4. A small fraction (5%) of the laser pulse was sent
to a 5 GHz photodetector using an optical splitter, and used
to trigger a field programmable gate array (FPGA) board
synchronous with the mode locked laser (MLL) pulses. The
FPGA board was programmed with electronic delays and used
to adjust the time delay of gate pulses relative to the arrival
W
DM
65:35
CIRC
Isolator
EDF
1
2
3
SAM
SAM: Saturation absorber mirror
CIRC: Circulator
Output
Pump
Fig. 5: Schematic of a mode locked fibre laser [25].
time of a photon at the SPD. The SPD was then gated with
a 2 ns electrical pulse. By adjusting the timing of the arrival
photon, relative to the gate pulse, we were able to collect the
distribution of photons within the gate width. A time to digital
converter, the TDC7200 from Texas Instruments, interfaced
with a TIVA Launchpad micro-controller, was used to digitize
the timing instants of photon arrival at the SPD, thus yielding
the temporal photon distribution within a gate pulse duration.
We swept the gate pulse, of various widths, in steps of 200 ps
through the MLL pulse repetition time of 42 ns and measured
the photon counts per second incident on the SPD.
Fig. 6 captures the uneven distribution of photon counts
corresponding to the unequal rise time and fall times of the
gate pulse. For a gate width of 2 ns, the photon counts/s
are a maximum for a gate delay of 13.2 ns. The fall time
in each data set is longer than the rise time, seen clearly in
the plots for a 2.2-2.5 ns gate width. The fall times are also
quantified in Fig. 7, with the minimum fall time of 0.85 ns
observed for a gate width of 2 ns. The longer fall times for
larger gate widths is attributed to after-pulses that occur after
the photon has hit the SPD, while there is no significant
change in the rise times. However, the plots in Fig. 6 and
Fig. 7 don’t capture the statistics of photon arrival within
the duration of the gate. Better resolution was achieved by
using the TDC7200, interfaced with an Arduino board and
the acquisition system shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 6: After pulsing effect with various gate width.
We achieved good temporal resolution by monitoring the
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Fall time
Rise time
Fig. 7: Effects of after pulsing extracted from the trailing
edge of the gate in Fig. 6, are observed as longer fall times
for gate widths greater than 2 ns.
time stamps associated with the clicks recorded at the SPD.
The TDC start pulse is synchronized to the gate pulse and
the SPD generates the TDC stop pulse. The gate delay was
swept in steps of 200 ps, and the arrival time of photons were
collected for each gate delay.
Before conducting the after-pulsing experiment, we mea-
sured dark counts of 300 counts/s with an internal gate width
of 2 ns, at a repetition rate of 120 MHz or an interval of 8.3 ns
between consecutive gate pulses. At a longer gate interval of
42 ns, the dark counts reduce to 100 counts/s. There is thus
a trade-off between our ability to detect incoming photons,
and becoming susceptible to higher after-pulsing probabilities.
Consequently, a high raw key rate does not guarantee a higher
sifted key rate. Although the total counts/s decrease as we
reduce the gate width, we prefer the shortest gate pulse of
2 ns as it yields fewer false detections.
Another parameter is the excess bias voltage (VEX), defined
as the difference of the reverse bias voltage (VR) and the
breakdown voltage (VBR),
VEX = VR − VBR (4)
To investigate the effect of excess bias voltage on an SPD, we
increase VEX from 2.0 V to 4.0 V, in steps of 0.5 V, keeping the
hold-off time at 10µs, and maintaining a SPD temperature of
233 K. Fig. 8 represents the photon distribution within a 2 ns
gate width for two excess bias voltage 2.5 V and 3.5 V. The
distributions have a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of
270 ps and 390 ps for 2.5 V and 3.5 V respectively. However,
keeping VEX ≈ 2.5 V, while changing the hold-off time (TH)
from 10 µs to 20 µs doesn’t effect the photon arrival time
within a 2 ns gate. The peaks in the distribution within a
gate width are a combination of timing jitter and quantization
within the TDC. However, a higher VEX clearly causes a wider
timing distribution. For our 4-state DPS-QKD experiment, we
fixed VEX at 2.5 V and TH = 10µs.
B. DPS-QKD implementation
Alice’s set-up consists of a continuous laser source at
1550.12 nm and a RF pulse generator. A train of electrical
pulses, having a pulse width of 500 ps and a time period of
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Fig. 8: Effect of bias voltage on photon distribution for an
excess bias of (a) 2.5 V, and (b) 3.5 V.
16 ns, are applied to a 3 GHz intensity modulator (IM). The
bias voltage to the IM needed to be optimized, to get a mod-
ulation extinction of more than 10 dB. The resultant optical
pulses were then attenuated, using a variable optical attenuator
(VOA), to a mean photon number µ ∼ 0.1. The photons were
then sent directly to a gated SPD and we observed 31 K-
counts/s when the gate window was synchronized with the
photon arrival time. This reduced to around 2.5 K-counts/s
when the gate was out of sync with the arrival of the photons.
Two different source configurations for path and time-bin
superposition, shown in Fig. 9, were then used in the DPS-
QKD experimental set-up shown in Fig. 10. In Fig. 9(a),
weak coherent pulses are passed through 1×3 and 3×1 beam
splitter-coupler combination so that photons coming out from
3× 1 coupler are in superposition of three paths before being
passed through the phase modulator (PM), shown in Fig. 10.
In Fig. 9(b), a 3 ns pulse coming out of the intensity modulator
(IM) is attenuated and acts as a source. Phase modulation can
be introduced on this pulse, as shown in Fig. 9(c).
3ns
IMLS
1550.12 nm
VOA
VOA
IM 1X3 3X1
2 ns
1 ns
LS
0.5 ns
1ns
1550.12 nm
1ns
(a)
(b)
(c) Phase modulation 
pattern
 }{0,
0}{0,
{ , 0}
RF 
Optical
Fig. 9: Weak coherent sources for (a) spatial, and (b)
time-bin superposition. LS:laser source, IM: intensity
modulator, VOA: variable optical attenuator. (c) Phase
modulation pattern
One problem with using two independent detectors to
differentiate between 0 and 1 bits is that the detectors are
not identical, and will typically have different quantum ef-
ficiencies. We mitigate this by using time-multiplexing and
capture photon arrival times from both output ports of the
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Fig. 10: 3 pulse DPS-QKD experimental set-up.
DLI. A fiber delay of 10 ns was added at one of the output
port of the DLI. Both ports were then multiplexed using a
2 × 1 coupler and sent to a SPD. This technique provides
a cost-effective configuration, since one SPD is enough to
extract timing instant information. Unfortunately, half of the
photons are lost due to the 2 × 1 combiner before the SPD.
But, since we can generate WCPs at GHz rates, we are limited
only by the hold-off time on the SPD and do not perceive
any disadvantage to using a time multiplexed configuration
with a single SPD. Rather, using a single detector has the
advantage of providing a equal sensitivity on both constructive
and destructive interference ports of the DLI.
A field programmable gate array (FPGA) is triggered syn-
chronous to the pulse generator and it is configured to generate
control signals for the SPD, TDC and a modulating signal (RF
pulses) for the PM. Phase encoding patterns {0, 0}, {pi, 0}
and {0, pi} are realized by applying RF pulses to the phase
modulator synchronous to the three different time locations
within a 3 ns temporal wave packet, as shown in Fig. 9(c).
The FPGA also provides a variable gate delay to synchronize
the full systems, and to identify the interference slots. We
recorded the photon arrival times by varying the RF delay
to the PM for a fixed gate delay. Sifted key generation and
QBER measurements for both space and time multiplexed
schemes were obtained after integrating a TDC and a time-
stamp module in the FPGA.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A sifted key was derived after counting the TDC output,
combined with that from a time stamp module. A final key
rate of 21 kbps and 10 kbps was achieved in the time-
bin superposition and path superposition schemes, with a
QBER of 17 % and 21 % respectively over 30 km of optical
fiber. By optimizing the DLI bias voltage and the control
parameters of the SPD, we were able to observe a QBER of
11.5 %, shown pictorially in Fig. 13. This is mostly attributed
to imperfect interferometry (DLI visibility of 83 %). Other
factors that contribute to the QBER are the rise time of the
phase modulating signal (approximately 270 ps), bandwidth
of intensity modulator (3 GHz) and the DLI bias voltage.
With reference to Figs. 11 and 12, the QBER is defined as,
QBER =
C01 + C10
C00 + C10 + C01 + C11
, (5)
where C01(C10) represents the total photon counts at construc-
tive port (destructive port) of DLI, when Alice’s transmitted
raw key is ’1’(’0’).
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Fig. 11: Photon arrival time distribution for path
superposition 4-state DPS-QKD
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Fig. 12: Photon arrival time distribution for time-bin
superposition 4-state DPS-QKD
We also recovered the sifted key and extracted the QBER by
directly comparing the sender’s keys with the receiver’s. This
approach was used to optimize the RF delay and appropriately
insert a phase shift every 1 ns within the 3 ns optical pulse,
using a fixed pattern of (0, pi). Although the phase pattern
was fixed, with a low mean photon number, channel loss, and
a detector efficiency η ∼ 0.1, we only detect a random bit
pattern after the delay line interferometer.
Fig. 13: Optimization of QBER by adjusting the timing of
the applied phase.
The sifted key generation rate in our time-bin superposition
DPS system can be written as [11]
Rsifted = νµηTLe
(−νµηTLτH) (6)
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where ν, µ, TL = 10−(
αL+IL
10 ), η and τH are pulse repetition
rate, mean photon number per pulse, overall transmission
efficiency of quantum channel, detector efficiency and detector
hold-off time, respectively. The overall transmission efficiency
of quantum channel consists of fiber loss due to attenuation
(typically, attenuation constant of single mode fiber is 0.2
dB/km) and insertion loss (IL) of DLI and coupler. Referring
to (6), the values of ν, η and τH are 62.5 Mbps, 10% and 10
µs respectively. The exponential term in (6) approaches 1 for
a transmitted pulse rate of 62.5 Mbps, with a hold-off time of
10µs, and Rsifted decreases linearly with distance. However,
the exponent becomes significant for higher transmitted pulse
rates, typically ν > 1 Gbps. As we observe in Fig. 14, the
experimental data fits well to (6), and we estimate µ ≈ 0.17.
At a fiber length of 30 km, we achieved a sifted key generation
rate of 21 kbps with a QBER of 11.5 %. We then extended our
experiment to 105 km of fiber, and observed the Sifted key
rate drop to about 2 kbps with a QBER of 14.4 %, as shown
in Fig. 14.
Fig. 14: Sifted key rate (estimated and experimental) and
measured QBER as a function of channel length
VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
We have presented two different experimental approaches
(a) spatial superposition and (b) time-bin superposition, to
realize a 4-state DPS-QKD over a 105 km quantum channel.
A prior knowledge of photon distribution within the temporal
gate width was essential to realize the time-bin superposition a
4-state DPS-QKD system. We used ultra-short weak coherent
pulses, from a MLL, to investigate the effect of the SPD set-
tings, bias voltage and detector hold-off time, on the temporal
distribution of photon detections within the gate width. After
optimization of various parameters, we achieved a sifted key
rate of around 21 kbps with QBER of 11.5% over 30 km
of fiber. We then extended our time-bin superposition based
DPS-QKD system to 105 km of optical fibre, and achieved a
sifted key rate of 2 kbps while maintaining QBER of 14.4%.
We observe that the time-bin superposition scheme is more
efficient and easier to implement and can be extended to an
M -state DPS-QKD system. A natural extension of this work
is to use time-bin superposition for round-robin DPS-QKD.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I: Decoy state implementations [26–28]
Author, Protocol Encoding Channel Key rate
Year scheme length bits/s
Frohlich et al., BB84 Phase 240 km 8.4
2017
Boaron et al., Simplified Time-bin 421 km 6.5
2018 BB84
Yuan et al., BB84 Phase 10 km 13.7× 106
2018 variant
TABLE II: MDI-QKD implementations [29–34]
Author, Protocol Encoding Channel Key rate
Year scheme length bits/s
Yin et al., Decoy state Time-bin 404 km 0.00032
2016 MDI
Tang et al., BB84 Polarisation 40 km 10
2016
Comandar et al., BB84 Polarisation 102 km 4.6 K
2016
Wang et al., Reference frame Time-bin 20 km 0.0063
2016 independent
Valivarthi et al., BB84 Time-bin 80 km 100
2017
Liu et al., BB84 Time-bin 160 km 2.6
2019
Wei et al., Asymmetric Polarization 105 km 6.2 K
2019 MDI
TABLE III: Twin field QKD implementations [35–39]
Author, Protocol Encoding Channel Key rate
Year scheme length bits/s
Minder et al., 2019 TF Phase 90.8 dB 0.045
Wang et al., 2019 SNS TF Time-bin 300 km 2.01 K
Liu et al., 2019 TF Time-bin 300 km 39.2
Zhong et al., 2019 TF Phase 55.1 dB 25.6
Fang et al, 2020 TF Phase 502 km 0.118
TABLE IV: Continuous variable-QKD [15–17]
Author, Protocol Encoding Channel Key rate
Year scheme length bits/s
Wang et al., CV Gaussian 50 km 700
2017 modulation
Zhang et al, CV Gaussian 50 km 5.8 K
2019 modulation
Zhang et al, CV Gaussian 202.8 km 6.2
2020 modulation
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